Surrender, Genocide … or What?

April 28, 2008

This article, which appeared at, is written from a European perspective. El Ingles sees problems facing European nations and culture as rooted in overwhelming numbers of non-assimilable immigrants from muslim cultures. American readers are encouraged to replace “muslim” with “mexican” because the problem Americans are facing is similar: an overwhelming number of alien immigrants who are not assimilating, but are instead colonizing areas of our country.

El Ingles analyzes three categories of “playout” scenarios that will result; and none are pretty. He doesn’t, however, address how the problem came into being and who are the enablers and beneficiaries of “change” in european homelands. Who benefits from introducing non-assimilable numbers of foreign peoples who don’t share our cultural norms and values? A solution to the ongoing race-replacement and culture destruction in european homelands must also address that dimension of the problem. Qui Bono?

Surrender, Genocide… or What?

by El Inglés


A few months ago, I wrote “The Danish Civil War”, a fictional scenario which served to structure a consideration of various issues relating to the rise of Islam in Europe and the likely consequences thereof. The essay finished with the conclusion that Islam constituted an existential threat to the survival of European civilization, and that Islam’s influence on Europe therefore needed to be eliminated. It further concluded that, logically speaking, the various ways of achieving this goal could be broadly subdivided into three categories:

1) inducing Muslims to leave of their own free will,

2) mass deportations, and

3) genocide.

(Hereinafter referred to as options one, two and three, respectively)

This final conclusion was delivered as dispassionately as possible due to a desire to present the situation objectively, as if an alien super-intelligence were viewing the conflicts of various warring tribes of hairless apes. If I am correct in arguing that the number of Muslims in Europe must be reduced to no more than a fraction of its current value, then the three options I discussed are the only three options for achieving this goal. We may consider all three to be morally abhorrent and decide to submit to Islam rather than avail ourselves of any of them, but that does not alter the brute analysis of what could, in principle, be done in response to the Islamization of Europe.

Having now had several months in which to further consider this issue, it seems to me that my conclusions in this regard can be considerably refined. For reasons that I hope to make clear in this essay, I no longer believe that it is possible to solve the problem that Islam has become by means of option one, and I have little confidence that even option two could constitute an effective tool in this regard. I therefore predict that Europe is being swept into a position where it will be forced to choose between relying overwhelmingly on option three and surrendering.

To the type of people most likely to read this essay, this suggestion will not necessarily come as much of a surprise. However, I feel that an issue of such gravity should be analyzed with as much rigour as possible, and this essay will constitute my attempt to conduct this analysis. I have much confidence in parts of it, but less in others, and would appreciate comments from those who feel they have greater or additional insight into key topics. There is certainly a huge amount of variety among European countries in key respects, which I have largely ignored here. Ideally the key claims of the essay would be explored on a country-by-country basis, but such an analysis is quite beyond me. There is also great variety in terms of the current degree of Islamization of these countries, and the amount of braking room that they therefore have available. To the extent that the analysis herein captures the imagination of any of its readers, I would welcome opinions on the likelihood or likely timelines of the different discontinuities discussed below.

These caveats out of the way, I will briefly describe the structure of the essay. It is divided into three parts. The first, “Decay”, will consist of an overview of certain aspects of the current situation in an attempt to establish the momentum already established by the forces of Islamization. The second, “Consequences”, will analyze the extent to which our options in dealing with Islam have been and will continue to be narrowed for some time yet by this momentum. The final part, “Violence”, will take this analysis further whilst also considering the likely nature of the large-scale societal breakdowns we will see as Islam in Europe continues to be what it cannot help but be.


Information pertaining to the decay of European societies in the face of the onslaught from Islam comes so thick and fast these days from such a variety of sources that there is no particular need to try and summarize it here. Instead, I would like to examine one particular aspect of the decay of one particular country in an attempt to establish the sheer momentum already inherent in the process of Islamization, which will have ramifications later on in the essay. Sadly, the country in question is my own, the UK, and the institution already in an advanced degree of cultural and political putrefaction is that of the British police. I will briefly summarize three examples of their egregiousness.

The first relates to that most sweet-natured of Muslim terrorists, Abu Hamza (Captain Hook to the tabloids). In 2005, under the Freedom of Information Act, the Metropolitan Police were forced to reveal that they had spent nearly £900,000 over a 22-month period from January 2003, stewarding (i.e. protecting and enabling) illegal street sermons given by Hamza after he was evicted from the Finsbury Park Mosque. Patrick Mercer, the Conservative frontbench spokesman on homeland security at the time this information came to light, had the following to say in response: “The effect of the police action was to make it easier for poison and subversion to be preached openly on our streets.”

However, according to an article in The Times, the paper which made the original request for the information, Sir John Stevens, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, expressed himself to the effect that his force had been presented with “a challenging policing operation” that had been handled with “appropriate sensitivity.” Contrary, it seems, to the lowbrow prejudices of xenophobes like the current author, spending vast sums of money on protecting criminals openly engaged in criminal activities in public is an appropriate response to the challenges of multiculturalism. Whether similar consideration would have been shown to large, illegal gatherings of white supremacists advocating, say, the ethnic cleansing of London, remains an open question.

Moving on, we have the inspiring response of the police to the online publishing of one of the Mohammed cartoons by the British magazine, The Liberal. In an online editorial explaining the decision to put the image on the magazine’s website, the editor, Ben Ramm, wrote the following: “[The Liberal] will not be coerced into self-censorship by the threat of violence from those who use a platform of free speech to call for the destruction of the very system that enfranchises them.” In other words, despite the very real possibility of being the target of violence, Mr. Ramm refused to allow himself to be intimidated by Muslim fanatics. Unfortunately, he was subsequently intimidated somewhat more effectively by “senior officers” at Scotland Yard, who conveyed to him that the resources of the police were “not infinite.”

Given that this is, in fact, a statement of the crashingly obvious and therefore conveys no information if interpreted literally, we would surely be justified in assuming that the police meant something else by it, something they could not say explicitly. I will hereby hazard a guess that the police had decided that by withdrawing the protection of the state from law-abiding citizens exercising their historic rights in the face of murderous religious savages, they could successfully conclude another “challenging policing operation” with the “appropriate sensitivity.” Presumably the fact that they were acting as highly effective force multipliers for the enforcers of a totalitarian political creed, which would destroy British society if it could, did not occur to them.

Finally, we have the controversy over the British documentary “Undercover Mosque,” which showed undercover footage from a variety of British mosques and Islamic centres of Muslims being Muslims. The response, predictably, was split down the middle, with Muslim groups taking the presentation of the filth spouted by Muslims as being evidence of Islamophobia (yes, really) and everyone else calling for a police investigation. The investigation, far from resulting in the charging of anyone caught on tape, resulted in the West Midlands Police complaining to Ofcom, the media watchdog, that the film had been selectively edited in a manner “sufficient to undermine community cohesion” and “likely to undermine feelings of public reassurance and safety of those communities in the West Midlands for which the Chief Constable has a responsibility.”

This development allowed the usual apologists for Islam, Muslim and non-Muslim, to crawl out of the woodwork, claiming that the revelations in the film were meaningless, the intent Islamophobic, and the featured imams victims. This significantly blunted any effect the film might otherwise have had in alerting the British public to the danger of the growing Muslim presence in their country. It also had the effect of libeling the creators of the film, as Ofcom itself concluded that “Undercover Mosque was a legitimate investigation, uncovering matters of important public interest… On the evidence (including untransmitted footage and scripts), Ofcom found that the broadcaster had accurately represented the material it had gathered and dealt with the subject matter responsibly and in context.”

I cannot comment on the soundness of the decision not to prosecute any imams featured in the film. But the way the police and the Crown Prosecution Service effectively accused the filmmakers of inciting hatred against Muslims in response to having been presented with incontrovertible evidence of Muslims inciting hatred against others strikes one as being a less than satisfactory response on the part of those entrusted with the maintenance of law and order.

As I hope I have demonstrated, we have concrete examples here of the following activities on the part of the British police:

1) Publicly and unashamedly protecting criminals engaged in criminal activities in broad daylight

2) Greatly amplifying the efficacy of shari’a-based intimidation directed at law-abiding citizens by criminals and would-be murderers

3) Subverting serious journalistic efforts to investigate the degree of Islamic rot in the UK by hurling libelous claims at said journalists, thereby helping to perpetuate the smoke and mirrors of the Islamic apologism that afflicts our societies

There are many people far better positioned than I to try and explain how it came to pass that the police could have become so thoroughly and hopelessly compromised. But the sheer scale of the disaster that this represents is something that needs to be appreciated, as is the light it casts on proposals to reverse Islamization.

It is striking to note that there does not seem to be any discernible philosophy or strategy guiding the response of the British police or establishment to the encroachment of Islam into our lives and societies. The terrible, mind-numbing boilerplate about inclusion, and integration, and assimilation, and reaching out, and Muslims being just the same as everyone else, and inter-community respect, and Islam being one of the great religions, and on, and on, and on, simply highlights their complete and utter cluelessness. Islam is a problem the solution to which exists so far outside their mental universes as to exist, in effect, not at all. This can perhaps be forgiven to some extent on the part of the police, who are presented with a demographic reality that they are then required to deal with. It is hardly forgivable on the part of their political masters.

Having accused the British police of not having a strategy to deal with the increasingly corrosive effects of large and growing numbers of Muslims in British society, I will now suggest that there is one strategy consistent with their behaviour, whether they have ever consciously formulated it or not. Simply put, it is the strategy of managing decline. The police have recognized that brute demographic realities render it impossible to ensure that the rule of British law continues to obtain in Muslim-dominated areas or with respect to Muslims in general, and that there is nothing they can do about it. They therefore take action against the most egregious examples of Muslim criminality, whilst simultaneously recommending that clergymen in London not wear their collars in public for fear of being assaulted by adherents of the Religion of Peace. They are, in essence, fighting a rearguard action against an inexorable demographic process, which can be slowed, but no longer stopped through mainstream political processes.


Anyone masochistic to enough re-read my earlier 10,000-word essay will find ample explanation of why I believe that accommodation of, indeed coexistence with, Islam is impossible, and I do not propose to revisit those arguments here. Instead, I will claim that the pathetic and dispiriting abandonment of pride and principle in the face of Islam described so far has attained a momentum that renders it impossible to reverse by any gradual process.

Let me first make clear what I mean by a gradual process. I use the term to refer to sets of policies and actions: a) implemented by existing mainstream political parties that b) do not consist of or result in major, long-term disruptions to the stability, security, or viability of the countries in question. It does not imply that sudden, far-reaching changes in legislation (on immigration, for example) could not be part of the process, only that such changes, if they occur at all, must come from outside the political mainstream that allowed the Islamic cancer to metastasize in our midst in the first place. This would prevent them from constituting gradual change as defined here.

My reasoning in concluding that gradual change is impossible is very straightforward. Consider a hypothetical, yet representative European country with a 5% Muslim population and the attendant problems that we are painfully familiar with and need not elaborate here. We can be sure that this country has a certain type of political and media elite, with certain ‘progressive’ attitudes towards national identity, immigration, religion and race, as only the existence of such an elite could allow a 5% Muslim population in the first place. This elite has at least three decades of intellectual and emotional investment in an entire moral-cultural-political worldview which is embodied in the corrupted state the country now exists in. So terrified at the prospect of having to confront the consequences of its macro-historical errors, which even it has now dimly started to perceive, it chooses a course of appeasement, making soothing noises to Muslims, and cracking down on anything that might displease them in whatever manner it can.

Let us now advance our country a discrete portion of time, say one year, during which the Muslim population has increased to 5.5% and become ever more accustomed to demanding and receiving concessions, while the ruling elite has made an even greater investment in its position and conditioned itself even more thoroughly to genuflect to the adherents of Islam. Is it now better positioned to confront the reality of the situation, or less well positioned? Clearly, all the factors that made a realistic appraisal of the situation impossible before are all reinforced now, which will only increase the extent to which the situation worsens when we advance our country by a further increment of time. I conclude that no extant political elite will take any serious steps to reverse the tide of Islamization. I do not claim that they cannot slow this tide down at all, and the tightening of family reunification and marriage laws in some European countries is evidence that the blinkers are slowly coming off. But this is too little, too late.

This argument about the inability of mainstream politicians to solve the Muslim problem will seem absurdly simplistic to some, ignoring as it does worlds of complexity, along with national differences and idiosyncrasies. But I would argue nonetheless that it is the fundamental dynamic at work here. Those who think I underestimate the chances of gentler political change led by mainstream political parties should consider the brilliant innovation of Gordon Brown’s government in the UK, in response to the terrorist attacks that occurred shortly after he entered office: Muslim terrorist plots directed at non-Muslims would now be referred to as ‘anti-Islamic activity.’ What to make of the people who dreamed up this ‘policy’?

Now the notion that the mainstream political parties who have put our head in the Islamic noose will not come riding back to take it out again may not seem particularly insightful. But that is not the key point to be made here. The key point is twofold:

1) Stopping and then reducing the Islamization of our countries will require a discontinuity, a completely new dynamic that overpowers these existing trends and that must therefore come from outside of the existing power structure, which is not capable of generating it.

2) Although, in principle, one can conceive of two distinct types of discontinuity, the electoral and the non-electoral, there is a very high probability that the first, if it could be achieved in time at all, would rapidly collapse into the second, resulting in a grand total of one type of discontinuity that could reverse Islamization.

To try and establish both halves of the proposition, let us first consider what these two theoretical discontinuities would look like. The electoral discontinuity consists, naturally, of the election of political parties from outside the political mainstream who would introduce new legislation to deal with the Muslim problem. This legislation would act as the basis for the implementation of some combination of options one, two and three as detailed above, all three of which still exist as options at this point in time. The non-electoral discontinuity refers to a discontinuity that bears no relation to politics in the normal sense of the word, but consists instead of a partial or complete breakdown in the authority of the state and a concomitant descent into chaos, subsequent to which options one and two are no longer available to any significant degree.

It must first be observed that the possibility of electoral discontinuity, clearly the most desirable of the two types of discontinuity, seems remote at present in most European countries, despite the remarkable efforts of Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and the positive developments in Denmark. Given the private sector opposition to his efforts, the fact that his party currently has only 9 seats out of a total of 150 in the Dutch Parliament, and the likelihood of existing elites resorting to every dirty trick in the book to foil him as his influence grows, it is hard to believe that a Netherlands with him or a similar figure in the driving seat is likely to exist any time within the next five years, during which time the window of opportunity for successful electoral discontinuity will continue to close. In France, another country neck-deep in the green stuff, Sarkozy was, some hoped, to represent the long-awaited electoral discontinuity. To be as gentle as possible, this does not seem to have been the case. As for Sweden, if what I read about its political and media culture on concerned websites is accurate, there is no hope whatsoever of electoral discontinuity occurring before it is preempted by something far more grisly. I note, for the sake of completeness, the existence of countries such as Denmark, Italy, and Switzerland, which hold more promise than most of refuting my position in whole or in part.

Let us focus on a single example and consider the most optimistic possible scenario for the Netherlands. I do not know the country or its politics well, but will attempt to use it to examine some general principles. If Geert Wilders’s Freedom Party were to attain an outright majority in the Dutch parliament tomorrow and attempt to implement option one, we would have achieved as neat and clean an electoral discontinuity as could be imagined. Would it be possible to solve the Muslim problem then without recourse to either options two or three? I do not think the possibility can be ruled out, but I think there are many factors that make it improbable.

Collectively, the Dutch have, until recently, offered, as far as the interested layman can discern, not a single iota of real opposition to the influx of massive numbers of adherents of a religion which considers everything they hold dear to be absolutely anathema (I intend no disrespect by this, and observe that in terms of sheer preemptive cultural surrender, the UK competes with the very best).

Despite Muslims’ well-rehearsed claims of how brutal and oppressive their host societies in Europe are, I feel that Dutch Muslims are confident that they, in fact, have the initiative in the Netherlands. The readiness with which they riot and burn, the shockingly disproportionate fraction of crimes they commit, and the demands for inconveniences such as freedom of speech to be removed to appease them are not suggestive of a people who shy away from conflict or have much regard for the will of the people on the other side of that conflict. Put differently, Muslims in the Netherlands seem to be desensitized to conflict to a very significant degree, be it verbal conflict or actual street violence. In contrast, significant numbers of ethnic Dutch seem to still be operating within a paradigm which sees civil breakdown along tribal lines as being literally unimaginable, something which can be avoided through concessions, and must be avoided at all costs.

This disparity in the relative appetites for and desensitization towards conflict is scarcely the type of thing that the Muslim population of the Netherlands could be unaware of. Much weepy-eyed talk to one side, it does not exactly seem to be a community living in fear. Of course, we have stipulated that the Freedom Party has already won an outright majority, which would only be possible with a significant hardening of opinion on the part of ethnic Dutch towards Muslims. But I do not believe the desensitization gap can be closed so quickly or so easily in either direction, and it is a key contention of this essay that this gap will be the key factor in turning electoral discontinuities (should they even occur) into non-electoral discontinuities.

Would a young, violent, disproportionately criminal community, possessed of (and by) a supremacist and totalitarian politico-religious ideology preaching world domination, significantly desensitized to the tribal violence most Europeans fear above all else, and already approaching being a majority in the biggest cities in the Netherlands, be likely to conclude that the jig was up for Islam, that it would simply have to pack its bags and leave? To even ask the question, I think, is to realize that the answer is no. They simply would not believe that massive amounts of rioting, killing, and burning tearing through the urban centres of the Netherlands would not be able to force the Dutch to back down and revert to their earlier path to dhimmitude. Thus does the chaos of the non-electoral discontinuity strip away from the hands of those Dutch who would still apply them options one and two, which both require an intact and dominant apparatus of state.

Weakness has two disadvantages, the weakness itself being but the first of them. The second is the inability to have a reversion to strength taken seriously without violence. The Dutch will inevitably overcome the first of these disadvantages sooner or later. But they cannot overcome the second without locking horns with their Muslim population in such a manner as to almost certainly collapse their hard-earned electoral discontinuity, should they even be capable of generating it in the first place. Even if I am wrong about the country already having reached this point of no return, where options one and two disappear and only option three remains, I feel that it will reach it very soon. And there are other European countries which are in similar, if not worse, positions, such as France, Sweden, and Belgium. Others, such as the UK, Germany, Norway, Austria, and Denmark do not seem to be that far behind. And the violence will prove to be contagious in direct proportion to its severity, destroying the ability of neighbouring countries to achieve or build upon electoral discontinuity.


I have argued that, in those European countries with significant Muslim populations, a situation is rapidly being reached, if, indeed, it has not already been, in which option three is the only option left for dealing with the Muslim problem. I have also argued in the Danish Civil War, that though this violence may well involve the organs of state, most obviously the police and the army, it will be of a scope and scale which will ensure that it spills outside any cordon the state may try to erect around it. This may well result in not only a collapse in the authority of the state itself, but a collapse in the coherence and command-and-control of such organs of state as remain intact, thereby accelerating the downward slide into anarchy.

The first and perhaps most important point to make in this context concerns the reduction of a continuum of violent options into a brute choice between a small handful of broad-brush approaches. Considering violence to consist of all types of physical coercion and all actions backed by the obvious and immediate possibility of bringing violence to bear, it is clear that the state, alone among all potential actors in the early, non-critical phases of a conflict, has the ability to calibrate without restrictions the violence it can apply to a situation. It can combine, in arbitrary proportions, incarceration, the prohibition of proscribed activities (wearing hijab, etc), large-scale non-lethal violence (using riot police, etc.), curfews, targeted executions, deportations, internment, mass expulsions, and large-scale killings. Moreover, the knowledge that it has access to these varied options will reinforce the likely effectiveness of the less draconian and therefore reduce the likelihood of the more draconian being used.

Following the types of discontinuity that I envisage occurring in the near future, we must observe that the likelihood of government being capable of maintaining an effective monopoly on the use of violence is exceptionally low, and that, in direct proportion to its failure to do so, the continuum represented by various combinations of the above options will be collapsed into a much smaller number of discrete, widely separated and virtually impossible-to-combine options. Incarceration after a fair trial will simply not exist as an option in the event of societal breakdown. Prohibitions of proscribed activities will be enforceable only through immediate violence, which essentially collapses this option into a new option not available to the state itself, mob violence and vigilante ‘justice’ centered on tribal markers such as dress, appearance, or language. Large-scale non-lethal violence takes large numbers of well-trained, well-equipped, well-organized and amply-supported personnel and is therefore the province of organs of the state, guided by intact political structures. It cannot exist in the circumstances imagined here.

Curfews require a patrolling presence by a heavily-armed controlling authority in areas of potential unrest and therefore suffer from the same problems as large-scale non-lethal violence. Deportations are a key point to which I will return briefly, but I suggest here that they will be impossible to organize on a large scale once the situation has degenerated to the point foreseen in this analysis. Internment that does not result in everyone being dead 48 hours later is obviously the province of government, with the massive infrastructural demands it makes of those who would implement it. Mass expulsion, the poor man’s deportation, though possible in principle on an impromptu basis, would present insuperable problems in practice that are presumably obvious but that I will discuss below nonetheless. As for large-scale killing, it is not only always an option, it is the option that constitutes the backdrop to all human conflict, whether we perceive it or not.

As this brief categorization makes clear, the tactical options left to actors on either side of the conflict in the result of non-electoral discontinuity become very similar very quickly, even if the means available to implement those options differ significantly. Surrender, flight, mob-style violence resulting in almost immediate segregation in major cities, and more determined efforts to actually start systematically killing entire groups of the opposition: these are the tracks along which the course of events will inevitably run once the grip of government on the situation fails.

And this is the tragedy of the situation and the scale of the betrayal. Government, the one entity capable of preventing the problem in the first place, and capable also of solving it with a minimum of bloodshed once it was indeed recognized to be an existential problem, has, in effect, simply washed its hands of it. In doing so, it has guaranteed the deaths of countless people and the utter destruction of the society it was responsible for protecting, at least in the form in which it has hitherto existed.

The joker in the pack here is the joint category of deportation/mass expulsion. I take the former to mean the removal of people by government in a relatively orderly manner, the latter to mean the expulsion of entire groups by violence and the threat of violence in a disorderly and impromptu fashion. The most obvious point to make here is the that the latter can only take place if there is some adjacent territory to which the group being driven out can easily gain access. Despite the dark mutterings of some that people like myself are advocating some sort of mass ethnic cleansing, it is not clear that this would even be physically possible. How would the French ethnically cleanse their Algerian population? By driving them from one side of Paris to the other? That, to put it politely, would not solve the problem. Perhaps they could drive them, by fire and pitchfork, into Spain. But one suspects that even the Spanish would not put up with this, and would simply drive their own burgeoning Moroccan and Pakistani populations back into France, bringing new meaning to the term population exchange. Mass expulsions as I have defined them here are actually not possible in a brute physical sense. Compare this with what, in principle, America could do to its Mexican (or Canadian, if you prefer) population, and the point is clear.

This leaves only the question of deportations. I am aware of no examples of large-scale deportations being carried out by aircraft, which they would have to be in this case. Apart from the faintly surreal notion of hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis being flown out of the UK and being served hundreds of thousands of halal meal options while fiddling around with hundreds of thousands of aggravating airline headsets on the way back to the homeland, it must be observed that air travel is the most infrastructurally fragile of all modes of transportation, and completely reliant on the goodwill and cooperation of people at the destination. A functioning government might be able to organize and carry out mass deportations via airline, but would surely be forced to preemptively intern the target population, and the notion that such populations in Europe would allow themselves to be peacefully interned strains credulity to breaking point and beyond. If this is true now, how much truer would it be in five or ten years time? Even the merest suggestion of implementing such a plan would surely collapse an electoral discontinuity into a non-electoral discontinuity for reasons already discussed. It is on the basis of this reasoning that I argue that deportations and mass expulsions, though the most difficult types of violence to read in this context, will not play a key role in post-discontinuity violence apart from perhaps being used to repatriate the survivors once the conflict has been won.

It is worth noting that the notion that some sort of Nazi-style genocide is in the cards for Europe’s Muslims would seem to be missing the point for related reasons. The Holocaust, like the Armenian Genocide that provided the inspiration for it, was conducted with as much deception and misdirection as was possible given the vast numbers of people involved. Both genocides were heavily reliant on the relocation of vast numbers of victims to sparsely-inhabited areas to be dispatched, whether in recently conquered territories as in the case of Germany, or the wilder reaches of empire, as in the case of the Ottoman Empire. There is no conceivable way that this would be viable in any European case, especially given the massive qualitative gulf between communication and surveillance technologies of the early/middle 20th-century and the first decades of the 21st. Whatever type of violence we end up seeing between Muslims and their host societies (and I do believe it will be appropriately described by the word genocidal), the Holocaust will not be much of a reference point. I suspect that the recent conflicts in the Balkans are much more likely to overlap structurally with what we will see in Europe in the near future.

The disparity between the levels of desensitization of Muslims and non-Muslims has already been mentioned. However, there is an additional consequence that should be mentioned here in closing. I am happy to be corrected on this point, but I have gained the impression from various sources over the years that it is precisely those who are plunged into violence without having been conditioned to deal with it psychologically, in whatever manner, that are most likely to commit atrocities (excluding those who are already ideologically committed to them). If violence does erupt in European countries between natives and Muslims, I consider it highly likely that people who had never done anything more violent than beat eggs will prove incapable of managing the psychological transition to controlled violence and start killing anything that looks remotely Muslim. Our unspoken conviction that we, in 21st-century Europe, have moved beyond such savagery will be shown to be an arrogance founded on a few decades of fragile peace and prosperity, taken for granted and allowed to slip through our fingers for no reason at all.

In Closing

Given my obvious and adamant opposition to European countries allowing themselves to have their political, cultural, or legal destinies influenced by their rapidly-growing Islamic populations, and my belief that, in all likelihood, violence edging towards the genocidal would be an inevitable part of removing this threat, readers would be perfectly justified in wondering if I am advocating genocide. The answer is no. Let me make clear what I do in fact advocate in the context of my own country, that is to say, the policies I would immediately implement if I were the sole, unchallenged ruler of the UK. I will not concern myself with any legal issues that would be involved in actually implementing such policies; ignoring such technicalities is one of the great pleasures of being dictator-for-a-day.

As newly installed ruler, I would introduce an immediate ban on Muslim immigration. If I were in an exceptionally good mood, I would consider allowing up to 100 Muslims annually to gain temporary residency in the UK if, and only if, they were married to non-Muslim UK citizens. Other than this, no Muslim would be granted permission to live in the UK unless essential (diplomatic staff, etc.). Visas, whether for tourism, study, or business, would be exceptionally hard to come by for Muslims, especially for Saudis wishing to go shopping at Harrods. As a result of this policy, exogenous growth of the Muslim population of the UK would be reduced to zero. The question of determining who was a Muslim and who was not would not be difficult for a committed immigration service to answer, and in the case of any doubt, permission to enter the country would simply be denied.

It would be announced that immigrant Muslims, of whatever generation, (i.e. the overwhelming majority) would all be investigated to discover whether they had any record whatsoever of supporting the erosion of British freedoms to further the dictates of Islam, and could demonstrate proactive efforts to engage with British society on its terms. Anyone failing to satisfy any of these criteria would be deported immediately, without the possibility of appeal. Ideally, the announcement in advance would serve to inform many Muslims that their days in the country were numbered, and provide them with a period of time in which to put their affairs in order and hopefully make a dignified exit from the country of their own accord. Muslims claiming to have converted to another religion would have to provide evidence of attendance at a house of worship of said religion for at least the last year. Questionable cases would be deported. Anyone having been judged to be in accordance with these criteria would be informed that they could be deported at any time in the future if they were judged to have ceased to comply in any respect.

Having banned Muslim immigration and deported some hundreds of thousands of people, thereby addressing the most pressing demographic issues, attention would be turned to undermining Islam itself at the institutional level. Mosque construction would be banned, and locations serving as mosques without official permission would be closed down by the police. Attending an illegal mosque would be considered grounds for deportation. Advocating or defending the use of violence in support of any Muslim cause would be considered grounds for deportation. Advocating the adoption of any aspect of shari’a law would be considered grounds for deportation, especially if you happened to be the head of the Church of England. A thousand and one various other gradual restrictions could be conceived of to squeeze Muslims so hard that they concluded that there was simply no point in remaining in the UK at all, up to and including the classification of Islam itself as a pernicious political ideology, the practice of which would be considered grounds for deportation for immigrants or their children, imprisonment in the case of native Britons.

Observant readers will note that this set of policies is actually a combination of the previously discussed options one and two, coupled with the obvious necessity of curtailing any further Muslim immigration. It also has the advantage of allowing ‘borderline’ or ‘cultural’ Muslims the option of staying in the UK if they understood that Islam had no future there and would simply be bleached out of British life over the course of a generation or two. But there are two other observations that need to be made here. The first is that there is not the slightest chance of any European country enacting policies of this sort any time soon, if ever. Secondly, there is absolutely no guarantee that they would not, if actually enacted, simply fall prey to the structural problems outlined in the discussion above, and result in us slipping all the way down to the bottom of the slide, where option three awaits us.